|
Massacre at Carandiru Prison
A Report from the Commission to Observe the Carandiru
Trials June 19, 2001
Massacre at Carandiru Prison
A Report from the Commission to Observe the Carandiru
Trials June 19, 2001
The Commission to Observe the Carandiru Trials consists
of:
CDDH Pe. João Bosco Bournier, Guarulhos – Centro Pela
Justiça e Direito Internacional, CEJIL – Comissão de
Direitos Humanos da Assembléia Legislativa de SP –
Comissão de Direitos Humanos e Cidadania da Câmara
Municipal de SP – Comissão de Direitos Humanos da
OAB/SP – Comissão Justiça e Paz, SP – Comissão Teotônio
Vilela, USP – Comunidade Kolping – Fala Negão –
Fala Preta – Fraternidade Cristã de Doentes e
Deficientes, FCD – Justiça Global – Movimento da Infância
e Juventude, Fórum CDA – Movimento Nacional de Direitos
Humanos, SP – Pastoral Carcerária, Sul 1 – Grupo de
Trabalho de Direitos Humanos da PGE/SP – Sindicato dos
Procuradores do Estado, das Autarquias, das Fundações e
das Universidades Públicas do Estado de São Paulo,
Sindiproesp, Sindicato dos Advogados do Estado de S.
Paulo, União de Mulheres SP, Instituto Terra, Trabalho e
Cidadania/ITTC, Instituto Sócio Ambiental/ISA, Ação dos
Cristãos pela Abolição da Tortura/ACAT, MST SP, Centro
Santo Dias de Direitos Humanos.
Thanks also to: Comissão de Direitos Humanos –
Cidadania da Câmara Municipal de São Paulo.
(Download the report as a Word97 document)
Introduction
The 1992 massacre in Carandiru, São Paulo state, Brazil,
has called into question the very foundations of Brazilian
democracy and has laid bare many of the problems of the
democratization process since the end of military
dictatorship in 1985. In particular, the incapacity of the
Brazilian judicial system to control public servants and
hold them accountable for irresponsible and illegal
actions in this case has exposed grave defects in the rule
of Brazilian law and democracy. This report describes the
results of the failure to rein in the repressive
mechanisms of the state—more specifically, the Military
Police—under the rule of law and equality and the need
to bring those responsible to justice after more than
eight years of willful ignorance.
The Facts of the Massacre
On October 2, 1992, Brazilian shock troops put a violent
end to a prison rebellion in cell block nine of the
Carandiru Detention Center by slaughtering 111 prisoners
in the largest massacre in history inside a Brazilian
prison. The disturbances began that morning when a fight
broke out between two prisoners, known as “Barba” and
“Coelho,” after an argument over an exercise space
within the prison. Before guards could intervene,
“Coelho” hit “Barba” with a wooden club, sending
him to the prison infirmary. When guards finally did
detain “Coelho,” they attempted to defuse what was
rapidly becoming a tense situation by taking him out of
the exercise yard and locking the doors. However, some of
the other prisoners became so agitated by what they saw as
“Coelho’s” cowardice that they broke through the
locked doors seeking revenge. The guards were unable to
control the violence, and shortly afterwards they
evacuated the area and sounded the general alarm. By 2
p.m., the prisoners controlled the entire area, although
they held no hostages and had made no attempts at escape.
At that time, prison officials notified Col. Ubiratan
Guimarães (then Commander of Metropolitan São Paulo
Police) of the situation at Carandiru. He immediately went
to the prison grounds, where he surveyed the situation
with Judges Ivo de Almeida and Fernando Antônio Torres
Garcia and called for reinforcements from São Paulo shock
troops under the command of Lt. Col. Luiz Nakaharada.
Then-Governor of São Paulo, Luis Antônio Fleury Filho
and his Secretary of Public Security, Dr. Pedro Franco
Campos, were also notified of the situation. At 2:51 p.m.,
state officials declared the state of affairs at the
prison grave and handed command of the situation over to
the Military Police. Col. Guimarães’ superiors quickly
decided that armed intervention was necessary, and by 3:30
p.m. had stationed Guimarães and his troops outside the
prison walls.
According to a government report, by this time it was
clear that despite the disorder within the prison, no
prisoners could escape from the compound. The prisoners
involved demonstrated their willingness to end the
uprising and negotiate with the Military Police by
throwing their weapons out of the cell windows and hanging
strips of cloth on the sides of the building in symbols of
truce.
The commanders present decided to try to negotiate with
the prisoners for the last time with a megaphone before
intervening forcefully. Meanwhile, at 4:30 p.m., 325 shock
troops (without uniform or identification) broke through
the doors to cell block 9 and, before any negotiation
could take place, pushed aside Chief Warden Dr. Ismael
Pedrosa and invaded the cell block under the direct and
explicit orders of Col. Guimarães.
According to all officers involved in the invasion save
Col. Guimarães, the prisoners ran for cover as soon as
the troops entered the cell block, offering no resistance.
They quickly took the ground floor and moved up the
building, shooting prisoners in the head and chest as they
went with machine guns, assault rifles, and automatic
pistols. Some officers also used dogs to attack already
wounded prisoners. After the smoke cleared at 6:30 p.m.,
515 shots had been fired, killing 103 prisoners, with
another eight dead from wounds caused by knives and other
objects. Another 130 prisoners and twenty-three policemen
were left wounded. No policemen were killed.
The Political Context
The Carandiru massacre occurred on the eve of the
municipal elections in São Paulo, a fact that greatly
influenced the official response to the slaughter. At the
time, the current leftist mayor of São Paulo, Luiza
Erundina, was winding up a failed reelection campaign
against the conservative Paulo Maluf. The elections and
this conservative political trend themselves were set
against the backdrop of the policies of Governor Fleury,
whose administration was marked by the inability or
unwillingness to fight police brutality and the
unjustified use of lethal force. This lack of control is
demonstrated by the 132% increase in civilian deaths by
military police in the city from 1990 to 1992, up from 585
per annum to 1359 per annum.
The elections, combined with a state government relatively
unconcerned with police brutality, likely led to the
willful withholding of information regarding the killings
at Carandiru. It is also likely that the failure to
disclose information was aimed at preventing disruptions
at the polls and aiding the campaign of the mayoral
candidate of the governor’s political party. It was only
twenty-four hours after the incident that the government
released information about the death toll, just as the
elections were being concluded.
Nonetheless, the Brazilian press provided detailed
coverage of the events at Carandiru despite attempts by
the government and Military Police to prevent the release
of further information. Even before the full story was
known, the public of São Paulo was decidedly against the
actions of the police; 53% of the public disagreed with
the police intervention while only 23% supported the
decision. Today, 53% consider the events a gratuitous
massacre, while only 39% believe the official version of
the killings as a violent battle between police and
prisoners.
The Profile of the Victims
A study of the prisoners killed in the massacre revealed
that 80% of them had not yet been convicted and sentenced
by the judicial system, i.e. they were still in the
process of trial and sentencing. Only nine of the 111 were
imprisoned with sentences of more than twenty years.
Almost half of those killed were younger than twenty-five
at the time of their death and another thirty-five were
either twenty-nine or thirty years old. Of those present
in the cell block on the day of the massacre, 66% were
imprisoned for assault, and only 8% were serving time for
murder.
The Scene of the Crime – Destruction and Tampering of
Evidence after the Massacre
Police began altering the crime scene immediately after
the killing ended, focusing on evidence that would point
to specific individuals. Civilians were not allowed to
enter the upper floors of the cell block while police
officers ordered the remaining prisoners to drag the dead
bodies from the cells and corridors and pile them up on
the second floor. Evidence-gathering was further impeded
by the cleanup and illegal disposal of the dead bodies by
the police as well as by the large number of corpses.
When the police forensics team finally arrived at the
scene of the massacre at 9:30 p.m., they inspected only
the first two floors of the building. On the second floor,
they found a pile of approximately eighty to eighty-five
bodies. The team did not photograph them individually, but
only as a group. After this cursory examination, the group
left and did not return for another week.
The forensics team concluded later that police killed
eighty-five of the 111 prisoners while the inmates were
inside of their cells. Police shot most of them in the
head and chest, suggesting that officers shot to kill and
not simply to disable, a theory supported by ballistics
tests. Of the 103 prisoners killed by gunshot wounds,
forensics specialists found 126 shots to the head,
thirty-one shots to the neck, 223 shots to the chest, and
seventeen shots to the buttocks. Further, many of the
prisoners were kneeling or lying down when they were shot.
Many prisoners had even thrown themselves into piles of
corpses during the shooting in an attempt to feign death.
The Military Police contend that the prisoners were armed
and exhibited numerous knives and thirteen firearms as
evidence of their assertion. However, forensic tests
showed that “all of the firearms show surface oxidation
consistent with storage conditions in improper places,”
suggesting that the weapons were planted at the scene by
police. The police contention that there was an armed
encounter between police and prisoners and that police
were simply defending themselves is also disproved by the
forensics report. The report concluded, “In all of the
cells examined, the bullet trajectories indicate that the
shooters fired from outside the cells and into the rear or
sides of the cells.(…)There are no traces whatsoever of
evidence showing that gunfire originated from within the
cells or that would indicate any kind of confrontation
between the victims of the shooting and those firing from
outside the cells.” The report continued to point out
that they were unable to make further conclusions because
“the area shows clear signs of evidence-tampering that
interfered with forensics reporting.”
The Cast of Characters Involved in the Massacre
Ex-Governor Luiz Antônio Fleury Filho – Cleared of all
involvement in the incident. Fleury claims to have been
informed of the massacre at 6 p.m. on October 2, 1992. He
withheld information regarding the death toll in the
massacre until the next day, only minutes before the polls
closed in the São Paulo city elections. Today, he is a
federal representative for the state of São Paulo.
Pedro Franco de Campos – Secretary of Public Safety at
the time of the massacre; Campos has been cleared of all
charges against him. Campos authorized the raid on cell
block nine and conferred with Governor Fleury. Today,
Campos is a prosecutor.
José Ismael Pedrosa – Chief Warden of Carandiru,
dismissed after the raid and transferred to the Taubaté
Prison in the interior of São Paulo state, where he
continues to work.
Colonel Ubiratan Guimarães – At the time of the
massacre, Commander of Metropolitan São Paulo Police and
commander of the police raid. After the massacre, Guimarães
served as a reservist in the Military Police. In 1997, he
was elected as a state representative, an office that he
held for one year. Today, he runs a private security firm.
Colonel Antônio Chiari – As a Lt. Colonel at the time,
Chiari commanded the ROTA (Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de
Aguiar), the group of officers that killed eighty-nine of
the 111 victims. Chiari has been indicted for aggravated
assault. In 1994, he was promoted to Colonel on the merits
of his work.
Major Wanderley Mascarenhas – Commanded the Special
Tactical Operations Command (Grupo de Ações Táticas
Especiais, GATE) in the raid. He has since been promoted
from captain to major.
Lt. Colonel Luis Nakaharada – Commanded “Operation
Cino,” in which Military Police dogs went cell-by-cell
searching for prisoners. He is accused of five counts of
homicide.
Major Valter Alves Mendonça – A Captain at the time,
Mendonça oversaw police operations on the third floor of
cell block nine during the massacre, where his troops
killed seventy-three people.
Captain Ariovaldo Salgado – At the time, Salgado was a
member of the Special Operations Command (Comando de Operações
Especiais, COE), and oversaw police operations on the
fourth floor of cell block nine.
Captain Ronaldo Ribeiro dos Santos – In the ROTA at the
time of the massacre, Ribeiro dos Santos commanded the
raid on the second floor of cell block nine, where police
killed fifteen prisoners.
Wilton Brandão Parreira Filho – Commander of a group of
shock troops that participated in the cleanup operation
after the massacre. He is accused of aggravated assault
and is currently a reservist.
The Aftermath of Carandiru – a Timeline
October 1992 – The Military Police begins an internal
investigation into the massacre.
March 1993 – A Military Police prosecutor presses
charges against 120 officers for their participation in
the massacre. However, Governor Fleury is cleared of all
charges.
February 13, 1996 – A military court decides to send the
cases to the civil courts. The defendants object.
May 1996 – The cases are sent to the federal appellate
courts (Superior Tribunal de Justiça, STJ) for a judgment
regarding whether the cases should be tried in the civil
or military courts. While the court is deliberating, some
of those indicted are already escaping punishment:
twenty-nine officers involved are cleared of assault and
battery charges when the statute of limitations runs.
January 1997 – Col. Guimarães takes office as a state
representative and receives parliamentary immunity from
prosecution.
April 1997 – The STJ decides that based on law 9299/66
(which gives jurisdiction over all charges of homicide
involving military personnel to the civil courts), the
cases will be tried in the civil courts.
June 1997 – After gathering more facts from officers
involved in the massacre, prosecutors indict other
policemen and request that Judge Nilson Xavier de Souza
grant a jury trial for these cases. The case against
Guimarães is put on hold.
August 1997 –Federal appellate court Judge Mohamed Amaro
requests that the State Legislature allow Guimarães to
stand trial while he still holds office.
March 1998 – Guimarães is not reelected to office and
loses his parliamentary immunity. His case returns to the
courts, which is to be tried apart from the other cases.
The cases of eighty-eight officers being tried for the 111
deaths are granted a trial by jury.
September 1998 – The judge indicts Guimarães for five
counts of homicide and as the man ultimately responsible
for all 111 deaths.
November 1998 – Guimarães requests a summary acquittal
on the argument that he was just following orders.
March 1999 – The courts reject Guimarães’ request and
send his case before a jury.
June 1999 – The other defendants request that their
cases be sent back to the military courts, but the
military courts deny any jurisdiction over such cases.
Based on what judges call “negative jurisdictional
conflict” (which means that no court believes it has
jurisdiction over the matter), the cases are sent to the
STJ.
September 1999 – The STJ decided that the assault and
battery charges are linked to the homicide charges and
must also be brought before a jury.
February 2000 – The Brazilian Government declares that
it will assume moral responsibility for the Carandiru
Massacre before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. The Commission condemns Brazil for the massacre.
At the same time, the STJ decides to include another
twenty-seven defendants in the case.
March 2000 – The trial of Guimarães is slated for March
22, 2000 and is later postponed to July 18, 2000.
July 13, 2000 – Guimarães’ lawyer asks to postpone
the trial further, citing health problems and the need for
more time to analyze information provided by the
government.
November 7, 2000 – The trial of Guimarães is scheduled
for November 29, 2000. Guimarães will be the first
Military Police colonel to be tried in the civil courts.
Should he be convicted, his sentence could be as long as
1350 years.
November 29, 2000 – The trial begins. On the stand,
Guimarães flatly denies the accusations, saying that he
never authorized the killings and that if any police
officer fired his weapon that it was strictly in
self-defense. He added that the raid was meant to “save
lives” from a fire started by prisoners inside the cell
block. Parts of his testimony, however, conflict with
Guimarães’ earlier statements during the initial
Military Police investigation of the massacre.
November 30, 2000 – Other information is presented to
the court, including depositions, police reports, and
tapes. Five more witnesses testify for the prosecution,
including four survivors of the massacre, and five testify
for the defense. At this point, the trial is expected to
last another five to ten days.
December 1, 2000 – A mistrial is declared because a
juror becomes seriously ill with a throat abscess and is
taken to the hospital for approximately five days. Since
the juror is no longer sequestered as required, a new
trial will be held with a new jury.
March 2001 – The new trial of Guimarães is slated for
June 20, 2001.
|
